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1  INTRODUCTION 
Many everyday practices exhibit the normativity of standing.  For example, 
one may ask a friend a favor, such as to drive her to the airport.  In so asking, 
one gives one’s friend a reason – which is the request – to drive one to the 
airport.1  Nevertheless, if one is regularly unwilling to grant similar requests, 
it seems that one thereby loses what I call “standing” to make such requests, 
even if one is asking for what is a perfectly legitimate favor among friends.  It 
is not that one’s uncooperativeness voids the friendship – one may be a ‘bad 
friend’ but a friend nonetheless and, therefore, one’s requests matter, as 
friends’ requests do.2  And still, given one’s hypocrisy, there appears 
something problematic with the request, making it at least prima facie 
permissible to respond to it with “who are you to ask for that?” and then to 
simply disregard it.   
 What I call “standing practices” are therefore puzzling.  They can 
involve what are otherwise meritorious interventions into one’s affairs that, 
nevertheless, one is licensed to disregard.  For instance, as the example 
                                                             
* Hebrew University of Jerusalem & King’s College London.  
1  There are of course other reasons to drive a friend to the airport, such as 
ensuring she does not miss her flight.  My point is that the friend’s request is 
– in and of itself – one such reason.   
2 Some accounts condition friendship on a measure of reciprocity and/or 
regard for the interests of one’s friends.  My assumption is that the ‘bad 
friend’ in the example still exhibits the minimally sufficient regard and/or 
reciprocal behavior to meet these conditions. 
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above suggests, although requests among friends are genuine reasons to do 
as requested, if the request is made hypocritically it seemingly becomes 
permissible to just brush it off.  The main question this paper aims to answer 
is whether such familiar practices are ever at least pro tanto justified. 
 I begin descriptively with introducing in the abstract the normative 
structure that I label “standing” (Section 2).  Next, the paper details 
categories of everyday practices manifesting this normative structure 
(Section 3).  The paper then turns to its primary end of providing a 
framework for the justification of those practices, which I label “practices of 
standing” (Section 4).  Upon exploring the limits of these types of 
justifications (Section 5), the paper summarizes (Section 6), and then closes 
with some reflections on the significance of understanding the concept and 
the justification of standing (Section 7).     
2  DESCRIBING THE NORMATIVE STRUCTURE OF STANDING  
Broadly, in “standing” what I have in mind is a certain normative structure 
which regulates interventions into the affairs of others.  From the point of 
view of the intervener, standing norms set conditions under which one is 
under a duty not to intervene (for example, one ought not make hypocritical 
requests).  And from the point of view of those intervened with, standing 
norms determine how they may react to interventions performed under 
those conditions.  Namely, if standing’s duty of nonintervention is breached, 
this triggers a pro tanto permission in the addressee to resist such 
interventions (for example, permitting disregarding a friend’s hypocritical 
request).3  As explained below (Section 4), the permission to resist is 
grounded in the same values that ground the duty of nonintervention, 
making resisting a kind of second-best option to the intervention having 
never been made in the first place.  Now to the details of “standing.”         
                                                             
3 Deploying more technical terminology, standing norms involve an 
Hohfeldian “privilege” to disregard certain interventions.  
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 Let’s begin with the idea of intervention.  Interventions come in many 
forms.  These include material interventions, such as physical interference or 
psychological pressure, as well as normative interventions, which take the 
form of the giving of reasons.  This paper focuses on standing to give reasons 
for actions.  Yet, the paper’s lessons are plausibly also applicable, mutatis 
mutandis, to other instances of standing, including standing to intervene 
physically or standing to give other types of reasons, such as certain reasons 
for belief or emotion.  Still, as the paper is devoted to the giving of reasons 
for actions, those other scenarios are left unexplored here.  
 Corresponding to these two primary forms of intervention – material 
and normative – the resisting of interventions primarily takes the form of 
either blocking or disregarding.  ‘Blocking’ refers to material resistance, 
which is in accordance with the resisting of material interventions.  In 
contrast, ‘disregarding’ involves discounting or even completely ignoring an 
intervention that takes the form of a reason for action that one is given by 
another.  As such, disregarding is a type of resistance fitting normative 
interventions. 
 Briefly, we primarily give others reasons for actions through various 
types of speech acts, such as when commanding, requesting, claiming, or 
demanding.4  A valid command, request, claim, or demand to phi is a reason 
for the addressee to phi;5 a reason that was not in place prior to the 
performance of a speech act of the aforementioned type.  Accordingly, such 
locutions apply normative force – sometimes even conclusive force – in favor 
of a particular action.   
 I call these types of reasons that we give through (validly) directing 
                                                             
4 For a more detailed discussion of reason-giving in the context of norms of 
standing see [redacted].  Ori J Herstein, ‘Understanding Standing: Permission 
to Deflect Reasons,’ Philosophical Studies 174:12 (2017), pp. 3109-3132. 
5 “phi” denotes an action.   
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others ‘directive-reasons’.6  I take the term ‘directive’ to stand for a broad 
spectrum of speech acts,7 including urging, permitting, suggesting, 
prohibiting, requesting, requiring, demanding, advocating, commanding, 
insisting, and claiming.8  Succinctly, directives guide or are at least intended 
to do so.  Directives, therefore, hold themselves out as normative.  That is, 
directives are reasons for actions or at least purport to be so.  More 
specifically, the reason that (valid) directing to phi gives is the directive itself, 
hence the label “directive-reason.”9  For example, a friend asking to drive her 
to the airport gives a (directive-)reason to drive her to the airport, the reason 
being that ‘she requested it’.    
 Of course, a directive can also generate non-directive-reasons to do as 
requested.  For instance, maintaining a friendship may be a reason to grant a 
friend’s hypocritical request.  Yet the normativity of standing, at least to the 
extent discussed here, is about directive-reasons only.  For instance, the 
hypocrisy of my friend’s request only impinges on my doing as my friend 
requested because she requested it, and not, for example, on my doing as she 
requested in order to maintain our friendship.    
 What about standing to blame?  Much of the literature on moral 
standing has focused on standing to blame (and to condemn).  As explained, 
this paper is about standing to give (directive) reasons.  While not all, some – 
and in my view many – instances of (valid) blaming involve the giving of 
                                                             
6 For more detail see Herstein, ‘Understanding Standing: Permission to 
Deflect Reasons’, pp. 3115-3116. 
7 I expand here on John Searle’s and Daniel Vanderveken’s terminology, 
Foundations of Illocutionary Lorgic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), pp. 55-6.  
8 ‘Directives’ include imperatives (e.g., orders, commands) but are not limited 
to imperatives (e.g., requests, urgings). 
9 For a similar, even if not identical, idea see David Enoch, ‘Authority and 
Robust Reason-Giving’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 
(2012), pp. 296-332.  
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directive (and at times other types of) reasons.10  And to the extent that they 
do, this paper’s thesis also covers standing to blame.11  One example of non-
reason giving blaming is blaming others internally, that is without 
communicating the matter to anyone.  Arguably, standing norms may also 
apply to such non-reason giving forms of blaming.12  To the extent that they 
do, it is not the aim of this paper to figure out how so.            
 Notice that a valid directive is in fact the reason that it purports to be, 
that is a reason for the directive’s addressee to do as directed.  Naturally not 
all directing locutions are what I call “valid,” that is not all succeed in 
generating the directive-reasons that they purport to give.  Conditions of 
validity of directives are many and diverse.  Here I will just assume that some 
directives are in fact valid.  
 Now that we have a sense of “directive-reasons”, what do I mean by 
“permission to disregard”?  As explained, when applied to interventions that 
take the form of directives, the normativity of standing entails that where the 
issuer of a directive lacks the standing to issue it, the subject of that directive 
is permitted to disregard it.  That is, she may disregard the directive-reason 
generated by the directing.  By “permission to disregard” I mean that one is 
allowed not to take that reason into account in one’s practical deliberations 
                                                             
10 see Herstein, ‘Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect Reasons’, p. 
3110-3111, 3116-3118; Recognizing my view on blaming, see Tognazzini, Neal 
and Coates, D. Justin, "Blame", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/blame/>.  
11 This paper joins those who have expanded the focus of the philosophy of 
standing beyond the case of blaming, to also include other types of speech 
acts, such as requests, demands, and forgiveness, and aims to give an 
account of standing not limited to a specific type of speech act (such as 
blaming).  Somewhat regrettably, we have come to live in a blame-driven 
culture.  And moral philosophy also, I feel, has perhaps become overly 
focused on blame, blaming, and blameworthiness. 
12 I have my doubts about this, although at the end the matter may just turn 
on a different understating of what we mean by “standing”.  
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because one is licensed not to conform to that reason.  Exploring the grounds 
of this aspect of standing – permitting disregarding and not conforming to 
(valid) directive-reasons – is this paper’s primary task.   
 Norms of standing therefore disrupt the normativity of interventions.  
When such interventions take the form of directives, what is crucial to 
appreciate is that norms of standing may forbid directives that – but for the 
lack of standing – one would be at liberty to carry out and the recipient 
would not be permitted to disregard.  Norms of standing, therefore, can 
make otherwise permissible interventions impermissible (the duty of 
nonintervention).  Moreover, norms of standing provide for resisting 
otherwise valid directives, such that were it not for the norm of standing it 
may be unreasonable for the target of the directive to disregard it.13  In fact, 
forbidding valid interventions and licensing disregarding them is the cutting 
edge of standing norms – were standing norms applicable only to invalid 
interventions, standing norms would have far less normative bite, because 
one could fail to conform to such interventions solely on the grounds of their 
weightlessness; no special permission would be called for.    
 A further crucial feature of the normative structure of standing is that 
whether or not one has standing to intervene turns on certain facts about the 
person making the intervention and not on the validity of the intervention 
itself.  Which is why I regard my conception of standing as akin to juridical 
standing.  In the law, doctrines of standing provide for rejecting legal claims 
due to facts about the person bringing the claim, regardless of and without 
                                                             
13 Here “unreasonable” means: not in conformity with reason and open to 
criticism on grounds of reason.  See e.g., Derek Parfit, Reason and Persons 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 119.  Accordingly, I use 
“unreasonable” differently than “irrational” as the latter is not about 
conformity to reason (such as conformity with value and morality) but about 
conformity with logic and rational thinking.    
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the court even having to entertain the legal validity of the claim itself.14  Such 
legal doctrines may be labeled “ad hominem laws.”   
 Here is an illustrative example of the normative structure of standing 
manifested in a concrete case.  Troubled by the scene of a young child picking 
on another child in the park, a bystander intervenes, ordering the child to 
stop (giving a directive-reason for action).  Under such conditions the child 
seems entitled to respond by saying, “You’re not my father” and then to 
disregard the bystander.  This is not to say that the child ought not stop 
picking on the other child, as there is an abundance of weighty reasons for 
him to stop, only that the stranger’s intervention need not count among 
those reasons.  Similarly, had the child’s parents blocked the bystander from 
directing their child, protesting “Even if he is misbehaving, you stay out of it!  
That is our job”, it appears that they would have been permitted to do so.   
 Notice that neither the incredulous child nor his angered parents are 
claiming that ordering the child to stop wasn’t, in and of itself, the 
appropriate thing to do.  In fact, the parents agree that considering the 
child’s behavior, in principle that was a fitting form of intervention; 
something that even the child himself does not contest.  Rather, the basis for 
the parents’ complaint is that only they have the requisite status to do so.  
That is, although the type of reason that the stranger gave the child was, in 
and of itself, befitting the circumstances, he was not the appropriate person 
to give it; he should have stayed out of it.  The problem with the stranger’s 
conduct therefore was not the nature or form of what he did but that it was 
him doing it.  Performed by him, ordering the child intruded upon the 
parents’ and the child’s protected domains, thereby triggering the 
normativity of standing – licensing the parents and child to resist and 
disregard the stranger’s intervention.  
                                                             
14 For a discussion and examples see Ori J Herstein, ‘A Normative Theory of 
the Clean Hands Defense,’ Legal Theory 17:3 (2011) pp. 171-208.  
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 Now, the normativity of what I call “standing” may seem puzzling.  How 
can reason license disregarding (and not conforming to) genuine (directive-
)reasons?  For example, how is it possible that the command of the man in 
the park or a friend’s hypocritical request are genuine directive-reasons to do 
as directed, yet still they are ignorable?  At least on its face such a license 
might seem incoherent.  
 Casting the normativity of standing in a rational light, I have elsewhere 
defended a view of the normativity of standing in terms of an ‘exclusionary 
permission’, which is the picture I will assume here.15  Briefly, norms of 
exclusion are second-order norms.  First-order norms give reasons to do (or 
deliberate, or believe, or feel).  Second-order norms give second-order 
reasons, which are reasons that are about other reasons.  Exclusionary 
permissions are a type of second-order norm.  They do not give or directly 
compete with first-order reasons but rather regulate the exclusion of some 
such first-order reasons from relevancy to one’s practical deliberations, 
regardless of the normative force of those reasons.  Namely, exclusionary 
permissions permit excluding (or discounting) certain reasons and not 
conforming to them.16  Importantly, exclusionary norms leave the force and 
validity of first-order reasons unaltered – they do not invalidate them but 
rather permit not conforming to them.   
 Notice that casting standing’s permission to disregard in a rational light 
– as a type of second-order reason – may establish that standing is a 
possibility in logical space, yet it does not, in and of itself, establish that this 
normative structure that I call “standing” is ever justified.  Thus, the question 
is are there any actual cases in which one may – within reason – disregard a 
valid directive on account of certain ad hominem facts about the person 
making the directive?  As argued in Section 4, I believe there are many such 
                                                             
15 ‘Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect Reasons’, pp. 3129-3130. 
16 On ‘second-order reasons’, ‘second-order norms’, and ‘exclusionary 
permissions’ see Joseph Raz, Practical Reasons and Norms (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, [1975] 1990), pp. 39-40, 73-84, 90-7.  
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cases.      
 But first, let’s summarize our discussion of the normative structure of 
standing’s license to disregard.  One may issue a valid directive – that is 
succeed in giving a directive-reason – and still lack standing to do so.  In these 
cases the directive, such as a demand or request, really is a (directive-)reason 
for the target of the directive to do as directed.  Yet because such a directive 
was issued without the requisite standing, the target of that directive is 
licensed to discount and even exclude it entirely, its validity and weight 
notwithstanding.   
 Norms of standing, therefore, entail a distinction between holding the 
normative power (such as the authority) to issue a valid directive, and the 
standing to exercise such power.  Accordingly, it is possible to lack the 
standing to exercise the normative power that one in fact possesses.  
Standing is a normative category distinct and independent from the category 
of normative power, setting limitations on the exercise of such power and 
opening up avenues for resisting it.17           
3  STANDING PRACTICES  
Now that we have a sense in the abstract of the normative structure of 
standing, I turn to detailing the many manifestations of this normative 
structure in actual everyday practices.  After which, the paper turns to what 
is its primary focus: the pro tanto justification of everyday practices 
manifesting the form of standing.   
3.1 Three types of standing practices 
Practices of standing include at least three broad categories of cases that 
tend to exhibit the normative structure of standing.  I label them “tu quoque” 
(‘you too’), “mind your own business,” and “know thy place,” collectively 
                                                             
17 For related ideas see Nicolas Cornell, ‘The Possibility of Preemptive 
Forgiving,’ Philosophical Review 126 (2017), 241-72, 264-67.  See also 
Herstein, ‘Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect Reasons’, pp. 3119-
3125. 
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referring to them as “TMK.”  These are general categories allowing for many 
variations, yet they all turn on facts about intervening parties, impose 
(putative) duties of nonintervention, as well as provide those intervened with 
– in breach of those duties – a (putative) license to disregard such 
interventions.18  Accordingly, these practices constitute social norms of 
standing.   
 In cases of mind your own business the type of ad hominem facts upon 
which the normativity of standing turns is lacking a stake in or being an 
outsider to the underlying matter in which one intervenes.  Colloquially, 
cases of mind your own business involve meddling and “sticking one’s nose” 
into the affairs of others.  Common and familiar responses to interventions 
performed under conditions of mind your own business include “this has 
nothing to do with you!” and “you stay out of it!”  For example, no matter 
how sound their prescriptions, strangers should normally not intervene with 
a couple bickering on the street; but if they do intervene, the couple is 
normally entitled to disregard the strangers’ prescriptions no matter the 
merit of those prescriptions, simply because it is not the strangers’ 
business.19 
 The second category of cases giving rise to the normativity of standing 
turns on circumstances of tu quoque, which involve interventions delivered 
                                                             
18 I use the qualifier “putative” to emphasis that thus far the discussion has 
revolved around social norms, the moral justification of which is the aim of 
Section 4.  
19 For discussions and brief examples of different instances of standing along 
the lines of mind your own business see Roger Wertheimer, ‘Constraining 
Condemning’, Ethics 108 (1998), pp. 489–501; Angela M. Smith, ‘On Being 
Responsible and Holding Responsible’, The Journal of Ethics 11 (2007), pp. 
465-84; Antony Duff, ‘Moral Standing and the Legitimacy of the Criminal 
Trial’, Ratio (new series) 23 (2010), pp. 123-40; Linda Radzik, ‘On Minding 
Your Own Business: Differentiating Accountability Relations Within the Moral 
Community’, Social Theory and Practice 37:4 (2012), pp. 574-98; Linda Radzik, 
‘On the Virtue of Minding Your Own Business’, Journal of Value Inquiry 46 
(2012), pp. 173-82. 
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under a cloud of normative inconsistency or hypocrisy.  ‘Tu quoque’ refers 
here to several subcategories of cases.  One such subcategory involves a 
person guilty of past wrongdoing similar to the wrongdoing for which he is 
now critically intervening with others.  These are cases of ‘the pot calling the 
kettle black’.  Another scenario involves a double standard, wherein one is 
barred from furthering or applying a standard or position that is inconsistent 
with the standard or position one has applied to other similar cases – 
especially when favoring oneself or those closer to one.  The case of the 
selfish friend presented at the outset is one such example.  Another familiar 
type of tu quoque involves perpetrators of wrongs later critically intervening 
in their victims’ wrongdoings.  For instance, at times Germany is reluctant to 
criticize certain injustices perpetrated by Israel, even when similarly Israel-
friendly countries demonstrate no such reticence.  An explanation that both 
Germans and Israelis often provide in favor of this reserve is rooted in the 
Holocaust – given its past crimes against the Jews, Germany lacks standing to 
critically intervene in at least some of Israel’s wrongdoings.20  And there are 
still other types of tu quoque cases, such as criticizing others for their 
involvement in a wrong that one is also complicit in or is otherwise 
responsible for.21  A biblical response to interventions performed under 
                                                             
20 To be clear, I do not claim that there is symmetry between the Holocaust 
and any wrongdoing attributable to the State of Israel.  
21 For a recent analysis of what I call “tu quoque” cases see Patrick Todd, ‘A 
Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame’, Nous (forthcoming) doi: 
10.1111/nous.12215.  For instances of tu quoque (mainly in the context of 
blame and condemnation) see Gerald A. Cohen, ‘Casting the First Stone: Who 
Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?’ Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement 81 (2006), pp. 113–36; Duff, ‘Moral Standing and the Legitimacy 
of the Criminal Law’; Patrick Todd, ‘Manipulation and Moral Standing: An 
Argument for Incompatibilism’, Philosopher’s Imprint 12 (2012), 6-17; Marilyn 
Friedman, ‘How to Blame People Responsibly’, Journal of Value Inquiry 47 
(2013), pp. 271-84; Kyle G. Fritz and Daniel Miller, ‘Hypocrisy and the 
Standing to Blame’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2015) doi: 
10.1111/papq.12104; Cristina Roadevin, ‘Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and 
Standing’, Metaphilosophy 49:1-2 (2018), 137-52. 
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conditions of tu quoque is “why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy 
brother’s eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?’’22  A 
more contemporary formulation is “you of all people can’t say/do that.”  In 
all these cases, interventions are both frowned upon and considered 
ignorable.      
 The third category of social practices exhibiting the normativity of 
standing is know thy place, on which I elaborate more below (Section 4.1.3).  
Unlike cases of mind your own business, which turn on a stake or connection 
to the matter one is intervening with, standing of the know thy place variant 
turns on possessing a certain status.  Such status may involve personal 
achievements or excellence, relationships, affiliations, social identity, 
personal history or some special role or position.  The case provided above of 
the man in the park is one such example – guardianship (whether or not one 
has a personal stake in the matter) is normally a prerequisite for legitimately 
ordering a child around.  A typical response to interventions performed 
under conditions in which one does not ‘know one’s place’ is: “Who do you 
think you are!”  Here too such interventions are typically deemed both 
forbidden and ignorable.   
 Notice that although central, TMK practices do not exhaust the realm of 
standing practices.  For example, a family member asking for help with his 
alcohol addiction gives directive-reason to do so.  Yet after the third or fourth 
time where one goes out of one’s way to help a kin per his requests only to 
be repeatedly disappointed, it may become (at least socially) permissible to 
disregard such new requests, their normative weight notwithstanding.  One 
could, moreover, imagine how otherwise morally tainted interventions, for 
example arrogant, mean, and petty interventions, could at times also trigger 
the normativity of standing.23  I will, nevertheless, limit myself to the already 
                                                             
22 Matthew 7:3, King James Version.   
23 In contrast perhaps to the views of Macalester Bell.  See Macalester Bell, 
‘The Standing to Blame: A Critique’, in D.J. Coates and N.A. Tognazzini (eds.), 
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rich contexts of TMK practices. 
 Typically TMK practices at least appear to exhibit the normative 
structure of “standing”: turning on certain ad hominem circumstances – 
meddling, hypocrisy, moral inconsistency, lack of status – under which one is 
considered to be under a duty not to intervene in the affairs of certain others 
and, if one nevertheless breaches that duty, the target of that wrongful 
intervention is considered licensed to simply brush it off without regard or 
deliberation of its merits.24           
 That our practices assume the wrongness of interventions performed 
under conditions of TMK is reflected in our everyday reactions when 
subjected to such interventions.  Irritation, indignation, anger, and at times 
even rage are often considered appropriate emotions to have in the face of, 
for example, meddling or hypocritical blaming.  Furthermore, it is often 
considered appropriate to manifest such emotions in locutions expressing a 
grievance and a measure of rancor, such as “mind your own business!”, “stay 
out of it!” and “who do you think you are!”   
 The wrongness of intervening under condition of TMK is also reflected 
in how such conditions regularly function as reasons not to intervene 
altogether, or to first ask for permission, or to apologize for intervening.  For 
instance, one says things such as “it’s really not my place to interject”; “I 
know it’s none of my business, but…”; “I apologize for speaking out of place, 
yet…”; or “I will understand if you completely disregard what I have to say…”  
These are all qualifications designed to preempt, mitigate, or at least 
acknowledge the possible wrongness of one’s intervention.       
 To be clear, I am not committed to the view that all TMK practices are 
                                                                                                                                                               
Blame: Its Nature and Norms. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 
263-81, 275.  
24 I write “…considered to be under a duty…” and “…considered licensed to 
resist…” to emphasis that I am now explicating social practices.  Whether or 
not those practices are justified is the focus of Section 4.   
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standing practices.  Social practices are complex, diverse, and not always 
consistent.  All I claim is that many such practices exhibit the structure of 
standing.  And it is those instances which I wish to illuminate and defend.      
3.2  Exclusion v. Invalidation  
 There is a competing account of TMK practices, an account which is 
assumed (less often argued for) in much of the literature on TMK.  This 
account, which I dub the “invalidation model”, holds that when issued under 
conditions of TMK, otherwise valid directives are invalidated, losing their 
normative force as directives.25  The standing model, in contrast, involves a 
permission to disregard directives regardless of their validity.  The 
invalidation model, therefore, views TMK not as standing norms but as 
authority-defeating norms or, more generally, as norms that void, or 
diminish, or are a condition for holding normative power.  Accordingly, under 
this view the justification of the practice of disregarding directives issued 
under conditions of TMK is simply a function of the putative normative 
weightlessness of those directives.  For example, even if normally the request 
of a friend is reason to do as the friend requests, we may disregard a friend’s 
hypocritical request because – given the hypocrisy – the request is 
invalidated and thereby fails to give any (directive-)reason in favor of 
granting it.  
 For reasons developed in further detail elsewhere, the invalidation 
model does not fit (at least many of) TMK practices.26  Most importantly, this 
                                                             
25 None of these authors explicitly addresses the matter, yet their accounts of 
(mostly) hypocritical blaming and condemning assumes the invalidation view.  
See Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 175-76; Saul Smilansky, ‘On Practicing 
What We Preach’, American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994), pp. 73-9; 
Antony Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 185–8; Cohen, ‘Casting the First Stone’; 
Friedman, ‘How To Blame People Responsibly’. 
26 See Herstein, ‘Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect Reasons’, pp. 
3119-3125. 
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is due to the fact that under practices of TMK disregarding directives issued 
under conditions of TMK is a matter of choice.  It is imbedded in (at least 
many of) our practices that if a directive is issued under conditions of TMK, its 
addressee has the option of taking that directive into account in her practical 
deliberation – including doing as the directive directs (also) because of or on 
the grounds of the directive.  Moreover, given the conditions of TMK, the 
addressee at times may decide not to disregard such a directive altogether, 
but rather to discount some (not all) of its normative weight.     
 For example, our practices assume that there is nothing unreasonable 
in driving a hypocritical friend to the airport where one’s reason for doing so 
is that one’s friend asked to be driven to the airport.  Relatedly, all else equal, 
it is not considered contrary to reason nor unreasonable to give less weight 
to such a request – that is, giving it some weight – than the weight of a 
similar request made by a more cooperative friend.  Or think of the example 
of the man in the park.  Could the child not reasonably consider and even act 
on the man’s directive?  I submit that we would typically assume that were 
the child to stop picking on the other child because the man told him to, we 
would not find the child’s actions or process of practical deliberation 
unreasonable.  
 Relatedly, we sometimes experience a measure of resentment for 
having been put in the uncomfortable position of having to decide whether 
or not to disregard an intervention that we were subjected to under 
conditions of TMK; as if there is a normative price to disregarding such 
interventions.  Such emotions further indicate that merely holding a 
permission to disregard an intervention does not entirely expunge its 
normative force.       
 Given that it is not considered unreasonable to deliberate on and even 
to act on directive-reasons issued under conditions of TMK, it follows that 
our practices assume that such directives can still have normative force as 
directives.  To provide guidance as a directive, a directive must have a 
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measure of normative weight for one to take guidance from.  This leads to 
the conclusion that the ad hominem conditions upon which social norms of 
TMK supervene are not taken to negate the validity of those directives.  
Accordingly, adopting the invalidation model would entail that the familiar 
practices of deliberating and acting on directives issued under conditions of 
TMK are unreasonable, which is a highly revisionist conclusion, given the 
pervasiveness of the phenomena.  Expounding TMK practices in terms of 
standing offers an account that saves the phenomena while giving it a 
rational explication in terms of an exclusionary permission.    
 At this juncture, in an attempt to shield the invalidation model, the 
interlocutor may fall back on the following type of defense: while it may ring 
true for the boy in the example to think that he is doing what the man told 
him to do because the man told him to do it, in fact he is acting for other 
reasons, such as fear of the man or for having realized the wrongness of his 
behavior thanks to the man’s directive.   
 A full response is beyond the scope of this article.  So, briefly, flooding 
TMK examples with further types of reasons demonstrates that life is 
complex and reasons are often plentiful.  It does not, however, disprove the 
presence of a directive-reason in such scenarios.  Furthermore, why not trust 
the very intuitive notion presented in the examples above that when acting 
on meddling or hypocritical directives to phi we really do what we often 
naturally claim to do – we phi (also) because of the directive?  Given our 
practices, the invalidation way of thinking strikes me as less intuitive and as 
much more theory-laden than these everyday intuitions captured in the 
examples: I am not unreasonable if I drive my hypocritical friend to the 
airport on the grounds that she asked me to.  It is just how practices of TMK 
often seem to work.27     
                                                             
27 For more fanciful examples pinpointing the presence of directive-reasons 
in cases of TMK as well as for further argument in favor of the exclusionary 
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4  JUSTIFYING STANDING PRACTICES  
But do the different ad hominem circumstances found in TMK practices really 
give rise to or, at the very least, count in favor of the normativity of standing?  
That is, accepting that our everyday practices of TMK exhibit the normativity 
of standing as social norms, the question is are these social norms justified?  I 
argue that they are, at least sometimes.  In a nutshell, the argument 
progresses as follows: exploring the values that practices of TMK reflect and 
protect; explaining how these values are interests of the individuals 
interfered with under conditions of TMK; discussing how such interests can 
ground standing’s duties of nonintervention and how breaching such duties 
wrongs those intervened with; and finally, accounting for how the valuable 
interests that underlie these duties of nonintervention can give rise to 
standing’s permissions to exclude and not to conform with interventions 
made in breach of those duties.      
 A word on methodology.  Justifying social norms is a complex affair.  
The social and other kinds of morally significant implications of standing 
norms are not only numerous but they also greatly vary with context.  Which 
is why offering all-things-considered justifications of the many instances of 
TMK practices goes beyond the parameters of this paper.  What I offer here is 
more modest, which is a blueprint for arriving at pro tanto justifications for 
such practices, focusing on the bilateral normative relations inherent to 
standing practices between the intervener and the party intervened with.  
4.1  Standing practices and value 
4.1.1  Mind your own business  
Let’s begin with practices of mind your own business, which function to 
protect values dependent on keeping certain spheres sheltered from the 
intervention of outsiders.  Values dependent on such sheltering are plentiful.  
                                                                                                                                                               
model of TMK practices see Herstein, ‘Understanding Standing: Permission to 
Deflect Reasons’, pp. 3119-3125, 3129-3130. 
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Although very different from each other, what these values have in common 
is a dependency on spheres free from outsiders’ intrusion.  Accordingly, such 
values count against certain interventions in people’s affairs and may even 
ground standing norms blocking such interventions.  Here is a cursory 
account of some such values.      
 Privacy is an obvious example.  At times we just need to be left alone, 
be it only for fostering a sense of self.  Other times a measure of seclusion, 
insulation, or even just the reserve of others is a condition for engaging in 
valuable activities.28  For instance, close, intimate, or otherwise meaningful 
relationships and associations often require a measure of isolation or 
distance from the intervention and attention of those who are not part of the 
relationship or association.29  Examples range from relationships of physical 
and familial intimacy to religious and psychological counseling.  Personal 
flourishing in different contexts and types of locations often also depends on 
forms of privacy, be it at home – calling for a measure of seclusion – or out in 
public – calling for anonymity and reserve from others.30 
 There are of course further values counting in favor of standing norms 
of the mind your own business variety.  These include independence and 
autonomy, both of which rely on a measure of individual liberty from 
intervention, including even a measure of leeway to err in the face of valid 
interventions.31  Personal development, including moral development, also 
                                                             
28 By “reserve” I mean behaving as if we are unaware of another or of their 
actions even though we are aware, and they know that we are, and we know 
that they know that we are.  And still, such reserve can provide a semblance 
of a valuable sense of privacy.   
29 For an exploration of the various values of privacy along such lines see 
Ferdinand David Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 151-91.  
30 On different states or experiences of privacy see A.F. Westin, Privacy and 
Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967). 
31 For arguments on how personal autonomy and related values can even 
ground rights against intervention with wrongdoing see Jeremy Waldron, ‘A 
 19 
requires a measure of liberty to make one’s own mistakes.32   
4.1.2  Tu quoque 
Broadly speaking, tu quoque cases involve not practicing what one preaches 
to, expects of, or imposes on others.  It is, in other words, about a form of 
hypocrisy or moral inconsistency.  Here I follow the literature in focusing on 
hypocrisy.   
 The disvalue of hypocritical intervention is diverse, as are the many 
different types of hypocritical intervention.  For instance, hypocritical 
intervention might involve low virtue and erode trust in the sincerity of moral 
claims.33  Yet given that we are searching for the grounds of standing in cases 
of hypocrisy, we are looking not only for an account of the disvalue of 
hypocrisy simpliciter but for how the disvalue of hypocritical intervention is a 
disvalue to those subjected to such treatment.  Remember, practices of tu 
quoque shield people from certain hypocritical (even if otherwise valid) 
interventions.  The question therefore is what, if anything, about hypocritical 
interventions counts in favor of such protection?  Now to be treated 
hypocritically seems prima facie deleterious.  Nevertheless, explaining why – 
at least in the sense of how hypocrisy can ground the denial of standing – has 
proven challenging.   
The focus of most of the literature has been on the hypocrite’s 
standing to blame, condemn, and hold others accountable.  And although it 
has its critics,34 currently the leading explanation of the wrongness of 
                                                                                                                                                               
Right To Do Wrong’, Ethics 92 (1992), pp. 21-39; Andrew I. Cohen, ‘Virtues, 
Opportunities, and the Right To Do Wrong’, Journal of Social Philosophy 28 
(1997), pp. 43–55; Ori J Herstein, ‘Defending the Right To Do Wrong, Law and 
Philosophy 31:3 (2012), pp. 343-365.      
32 Radzik, ‘On Minding Your Own Business’, p. 593. 
33 For a discussion of the ills of hypocrisy along such lines see Christine 
McKinnon, ‘Hypocrisy, With a Note on Integrity’, American Philosophical 
Quarterly 28 (1991), pp. 321-30. 
34 See e.g., Todd, ‘A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame’. 
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hypocritical blame, condemnation and holding to account is that it violates 
the principle of the equal moral status and worth of persons.35  A somewhat 
related view is that such hypocrisy is a form of unjustified evaluative 
discrimination.36  Yet another relevant take on the wrongness of hypocrisy 
focuses on the hypocrite’s failure of reciprocity in moral self-scrutiny.37      
 Extracting from these different versions, here is how I would craft the 
essence of the egalitarian account of the wrong of hypocrisy.  To help oneself 
(or those that one favors) to liberties under the same circumstances in which 
one is unwilling – purportedly as a matter of moral principle – to offer the 
same treatment to others is a form of disrespect.  Such hypocrisy involves 
treating and morally judging differently what are – on one’s own (purported) 
moral lights – morally similar cases.  Accordingly, the hypocrite exempts 
herself from what she believes or, at least, from what she holds herself out to 
believe, is a moral norm.  And she does so for what are irrelevant reasons 
under that (purported) moral norm. 
 Such conduct amounts to treating others as one’s moral inferiors, as it 
involves exempting oneself from moral norms and moral judgment based on 
what are, by one’s own (purported) lights, irrelevant grounds – such as 
exempting oneself from a moral norm for no other reason than it is oneself 
that one is exempting.  This kind of lax treatment towards oneself (and those 
one favors) coupled with stricter treatment of others amounts to regarding 
oneself – and not others – as ‘above the moral law’ or, at the very least, as 
worth more than others, thereby wronging them by regarding and treating 
them as one’s moral inferiors.  Notice that it does not seem to matter 
whether or not the hypocrite believes in what she is preaching.  It is enough 
that she behaves as if she does, thereby treating the targets of her preaching 
                                                             
35 R. Jay Wallace, ‘Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of 
Persons’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (2010), pp. 307-41; Fritz and Miller, 
‘Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame’. 
36 Friedman, ‘How To Blame People Responsibly’. 
37 Roadevin, ‘Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing’.  
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as her moral inferiors.      
4.1.3  Know thy place  
What values, if any, animate practices of know thy place?  There are familiar 
circumstances in which what are otherwise justified and valid interventions 
are, nevertheless, made wrongful and are permissibly resisted on the 
grounds that those intervening lack a certain status vis-à-vis the target of 
their intervention.  For instance, in many contexts certain reproach is only 
permissibly delivered among members of the same ethnic or national group 
or among friends or family members, not by outsiders.  In such cases, unlike 
cases of mind your own business, standing does not turn (at least not only) on 
personal involvement nor on a personal stake in the matter, but on some 
type of kindship with or proximity to the subject of the intervention.   
 Practices of know thy place serve to protect values dependent on some 
people holding an exclusive privilege to intervene, for instance, when such 
exclusivity is crucial and even constitutive of certain valuable personal and 
social ties.  Possessing exclusive privilege to intervene in the affairs of certain 
others is often an important feature of valuable affiliations, bonds of 
fraternity, relationships, friendship, and love.  Depending on the context, 
one’s spouse, parents, siblings, close friends, teachers, mentors, and even 
compatriots are (as a matter of practice) exclusively at liberty to demand, 
ask, criticize, and even physically intervene with some of one’s choices simply 
because they are one’s spouse, parents, siblings, close friends, teachers, 
mentors, and compatriots.  And without such an exclusive privilege to 
intervene, something in these valuable relations is diminished, risking even 
dissolving the relation itself.  For example, that a close friend may intervene 
where all others may not is part and parcel of close friendship.  Accordingly, 
protecting this exclusivity serves to protect the valuable relationship.    
 Valuable hierarchical relationships often also require that some parties 
to a relationship hold an exclusive privilege to intervene in the affairs of other 
parties to the relationship, such as in the case of parents and their children.  
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Here too, the weakening of exclusivity can bring about the weakening and 
even dissolution of the essence of these types of valuable relationships, 
providing reason in favor of privileging some to intervene while denying that 
liberty to most others, even when, in and of themselves, the latter’s 
interventions are valid.  Such was the case in the example given above of the 
bystander and the child in the park.          
 Yet other cases of know thy place protect exclusivity in intervention as 
an expression of respect or honor or other special type of regard.  Standing to 
intervene can, for instance, function as a form of respect or honoring of 
personal achievement or personal history.  For example, there are certain 
interventions into our affairs that we would reject offhand without any 
substantive deliberation if delivered by anyone other than, for example, 
mentors, elders or certain types of personal or cultural heroes.  And this kind 
of exclusivity in the liberty to intervene serves as a form of respect, devotion, 
fidelity and commitment to certain others simply by virtue of who they are. 
4.2  From values to interests 
The various values that TMK practices reflect and protect are not free-
floating, at least not entirely.  Values such as autonomy, privacy, equal 
respect, and meaningful relationships invariably involve individuals and are of 
value for those individuals.  Accordingly, TMK practices appear structured to 
protect certain valuable personal interests, which are primarily the interests 
of those intervened with under conditions of TMK.    
4.3  From interests to duties of nonintervention 
Having canvased some of the valuable personal interests at stake in our social 
practices of standing, what is left to explore is whether those interests can 
indeed give rise to standing’s two normative prongs: 1) the duty of 
nonintervention and, if breached, 2) the license to disregard interventions 
issued in violation of that duty.  I will begin with the former.  To be clear, the 
richness of TMK practices, the diversity of the values that they protect, and 
the numerous factual nuances of every instance of every type of standing 
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practice, preclude my offering anything nearing a detailed analysis of their 
respective justifications.  As already explained, here I offer a blueprint for 
how justifications of specific standing practices would go, offering at most 
pro tanto justifications.      
 Values underpin reasons and, if sufficiently weighty or otherwise 
conclusive, reasons may count in favor of and even justify duties to respect 
such values.38  When at stake, the aforementioned values involved in 
standing practices – valuable relationships, privacy, autonomy, reciprocity, 
equal moral worth and respect, independence etc. – are certainly commonly 
considered weighty enough to ground duties of nonintervention.  At least 
within the liberal tradition, these values are the stuff that moral duties are 
made of.  Accordingly, in the absence of defeating reasons, the valuable 
interests that practices of TMK serve to protect give rise to duties of 
nonintervention, which are duties that protect those interests.           
 Therefore, grounded in genuine, familiar, and weighty values, the duties 
of nonintervention assumed in our social practices of standing appear pro 
tanto justified.  Moreover, given their grounding in interests, such duties of 
nonintervention are directed-duties – that is duties to the party whose 
interests they protect.39   
4.4  From duties of nonintervention to wronging 
Breaches of duties are wrongs.  Given that (when justified) TMK practices 
denote duties of nonintervention, it follows that intervening under such 
conditions is wrongful.  Moreover, to intervene without standing to do so is 
not a free-floating wrong.  Given the directed nature of these duties of 
                                                             
38 For a discussion on how interests may ground duties towards interest 
holders (as well as corresponding rights) see e.g., Joseph Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 165-92; Mathew 
Kramer, ‘Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights’, 
Ethics 123 (2013), pp. 245-63  
39 On directed duties see Simon Cabulea May, ‘Directed Duties’, Philosophy 
Compass 10/8 (2015), pp. 523–32, 10.1111/phc3.12239.  
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nonintervention, breaching them is a wrong to the party intervened with.  
That is, to intervene without standing is to wrong the party whose valuable 
interests gave rise to the duty not to intervene in the first place.  Accordingly, 
breaching standing’s duties of nonintervention is not only wrongful 
simpliciter, it is also a wrong to those intervened with.  Which, as explored 
above (Section 3.1), is reflected in typical everyday reactions to interventions 
performed under conditions of TMK.     
4.5  From wronging to standing’s permission to exclude 
Moving on to to standing’s second prong, what grounds standing’s 
permission to disregard directives?  Remember, standing norms permit 
disregarding what are otherwise valid directives, such that when faced with a 
directive issued without standing, one may disregard it even if – were it not 
for the issue of standing – disregarding would be impermissible.  As 
explained, standing involves second-order norms of exclusionary permission.  
The question we now turn to is what, if anything, justifies such permissions in 
the context of TMK?      
 On the face of things, the answer may seem straightforward: it is the 
wrongness of intervening under conditions such as TMK that justifies the 
license to disregard such interventions.  Yet matters are more complicated.  
Depending on the circumstances, morality responds to wrongdoing in 
different ways, such as punitively, correctively, and restoratively.  Justifying 
practices of standing depends, therefore, on more than just demonstrating 
that such practices involve a ‘response’ to a wrong, but also that that specific 
form of response – a permission to disregard and to not conform to the 
wrongful yet valid intervention – is justified.  
4.5.1 The continuity of values  
 The answer begins with noticing how the same value can give rise to 
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different duties.40  Once breached, a duty cannot be unbreached and, 
therefore, remains forever unsatisfied.  For example, once I breach my duty 
not to steal my neighbor’s morning newspaper I cannot go back in time and 
‘unsteal’ it.  Even returning the newspaper does not change the fact that I 
stole in violation of my duty.  Nothing can.  But what about those underlying 
values that gave rise to the breached duty?  Clearly, they continue projecting 
normative force and they, at least to a degree, can still be respected in the 
post-breach world.  For example, assume that my duty not to steal my 
neighbor’s newspaper is predicated on her interests in feeling secure in her 
effects and in staying informed on current affairs.  These valuable interests 
remain in force even after the newspaper is stolen.  Accordingly, in the post-
breach world, given that the duty not to steal the newspaper has been 
breached, the values that gave rise to that duty may give rise to other duties, 
such as a duty to return the newspaper as soon as possible and to apologize 
for taking it. 
 In terms of respecting the values underlying the original duty of 
nonintervention, these new duties of restitution and apology are second 
best, as they promise only partial conformity with reason.  The better path to 
respect those values was to comply with the original but now breached duty.  
It is only once this primary path is blocked that the secondary path opens as 
the best remaining option to respect the values underlying the initial primary 
obligation not to steal.  Were the two duties – the duty not to steal and, if 
stolen, the duty to apologize and return the item – just as good vis-à-vis the 
underlying values that ground them, they would have arisen as normative 
alternatives in the first place.  But of course, they are not alternatives – not 
                                                             
40 I take my inspiration from John Gardner, ‘What is Tort Law For? Part 1’, 
Law and Philosophy 30 (2011), pp. 1–50; Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), pp. 233-62; and, Joseph Raz, 
‘Personal Practical Conflicts’, in P. Baumann and M. Betzler (eds.), Practical 
Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), pp. 172-92, 189-93. 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stealing is normatively better than stealing plus returning/compensating.  
 This logic of continuity between the grounds of primary and secondary 
duties nicely explains the grounds for standing’s license to disregard. As 
explained above, circumstances of TMK involve valuable interests that are 
dependent on a measure of nonintervention.  Those values give rise to 
standing’s duties of nonintervention.  When those duties are breached, they 
cannot be unbreached – the wrongful intervention has already occurred.  Yet, 
the values that gave rise to those duties not to intervene persist in projecting 
normative force – people’s autonomy, privacy, equal moral status, and 
valuable relationships still matter; which is where the license to disregard 
comes in – upon its breach, the same values that grounded the duty of 
nonintervention ground a permission to disregard and not conform to 
interventions performed in breach of that duty.   
 But why a permission to disregard?  Why not, for instance, 
compensation or punishment?  Why, in other words, is the permission to 
disregard the second-best to nonintervention in the first place, as opposed to 
some other remedial norm?  My explanation has two stages.  First, the values 
underlying the duty of nonintervention are best served by swatting away 
such interventions.  Second, the best way to swat away such an intervention 
is to permit its exclusion.         
 Here is a legal analogy.  The law of nuisance often deals with ongoing 
violations of plaintiffs’ rights to the reasonable use and enjoyment of their 
land.  Typical cases involve, for example, substantial ongoing noise or 
pollution emanating from a neighboring factory.  Given that such wrongs are 
ongoing, courts face the dilemma of which remedy to grant the plaintiff.  
Should the court issue an injunction, ordering the defendant to cease his 
wrongful activities?  Or, alternatively, should the court allow the defendant’s 
activity to go on, so long as he continues paying damages for the ongoing 
nuisance?  In most jurisdictions, the default remedy is injunctive.  And it is 
easy to see why – the right that the tort of nuisance is designed to protect 
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(the reasonable use and enjoyment of one’s land) is better served by an 
injunction than by damages.  To grant damages in lieu of an injunction, courts 
typically require demonstrating certain exceptional circumstances.41   
 Similarly, a permission to exclude an intervention would better serve 
the values underlying the duty of nonintervention than would, for example, 
some form of compensation or punishment.  The best way to confront an 
ongoing infringement of privacy, autonomy, equal respect, or valuable 
relationship is to swat it away rather than to permit it to go on and 
compensate or punish for it.   
 Given this, what is the best way to swat interventions that take the 
form of directives?  We are dealing with a case of an ongoing wrong in the 
form of a wrongfully issued reason for action.  Once the wrongful (yet valid) 
directive-reason is issued, it impinges and continues to impinge on its target’s 
valuable interests.  For example, once my hypocritical friend gives me a 
reason to drive her to the airport by asking me to do so, that reason 
continues to impinge on my status as an equal, at least until the departure of 
her flight.  A permission to exclude protects one from such ongoing intrusion 
by permitting one to effectively swat it away, that is, not to comply with it or 
even deliberate on it.  The law of trespass to chattel offers a helpful analogy.  
If one attempts to interfere with my possession of my personal property, I 
am permitted, as a form of self-help, to use reasonable force (the use of 
which would be otherwise impermissible) to protect my possession.42  Now, 
as explained, directives are normative interventions, making it impossible to 
swat them away physically.  Nevertheless, what one can do is disregard 
them.  Unlike the remedy of a permission to disregard, which is a permission 
to a kind of self-help, alternative remedies, such as punishing the wrongdoer 
or pressuring him to rescind the directive or relying on institutional or some 
other third-party assistance, are mostly far less likely to succeed in protecting 
                                                             
41 See e.g., Watson v Croft Promo-Sport Ltd [2008] EWHC 759 (QB). 
42 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218 cmt. e 
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the victim’s interests than simply disregarding the wrongful directives.     
 The logic of continuity in the values grounding a duty and the remedy 
for breaches of that duty also flesh out the nature of the relation between 
standing’s two normative prongs: the duty of nonintervention and the 
permission to disregard interventions.  An important implication of such 
continuity is that breach of duty involves a normative remainder, even upon 
remedying the breach.43  Given that compliance with duty is normatively 
superior – vis-à-vis the grounding underlying values – to any form of partial 
compliance with the reasons arising out of those values, breach-plus-remedy 
always entails a normative deficit vis-à-vis those values; which fleshes out the 
relation between standing’s duty of nonintervention and standing’s 
permission to disregard interventions: the latter is a second-best remedy of 
breaches of the former.  Thus, the fact that one may disregard certain 
interventions does not entail that such interventions are not wrongful.  We 
can detect such normative remainders in our behavior.  As explored above, 
common and seemingly appropriate responses to interventions issued under 
conditions of TMK involve anger, annoyance, and indignation, reactions that 
persist notwithstanding the permission to exclude.   
4.5.2 The cutting edge of standing: not acting on the balance of reasons   
 We are not yet out of the woods.  As explained, standing’s license to 
exclude is a license to exclude interventions that, in and of themselves, 
possibly have merit and normative force.  Moreover, the cutting edge of 
standing practices is the permission to disregard even conclusive reasons or 
reasons that tip the balance of reasons.  Recall, standing’s permission to 
disregard a directive entails that one may not conform to that directive, even 
if obligating.  Justifying such a normative structure is not a trivial matter.  
                                                             
43 For ideas along these lines see Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Realm of Rights 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Raz, ‘Personal Practical 
Conflicts’, pp. 189-93; Gardner, ‘What is Tort Law For? Part 1’, pp. 28-37; 
John Gardner, From Personal Life to Private Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), pp. 125-60.  
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After all, why would reason giveth with one hand (a normative power to give 
reasons) what it taketh away with the other (a license to disregard those 
reasons)?  And why would reason permit acting against the balance of 
reasons?   
 In cases of directives issued without standing we are basically dealing 
with the following scenario: X (validly) directs Y to phi thereby imposing a 
new (directive-)reason on Y to phi.  In so doing, X normatively intervenes with 
Y, giving Y a reason to phi that did not exist prior to X’s directive.  Such 
normative interventions change the normative landscape. They rearrange, if 
you will, the web of reasons in relation to which Y must negotiate his actions 
and choices, respond to, and is normatively assessable and responsible for.   
 Now, at times such interventions may not amount to much.  They may 
fall short of significantly influencing the complex web of reasons that apply 
and make demands on one, and they need not necessarily tip the balance of 
reasons in favor of a specific action or directly obligate one to conform with 
them.   
 Yet, the cutting edge of norms of standing is in those cases where 
interventions do intrude on one’s liberty – impacting and altering what one 
ought to do.  When this is the case, the basic scenario is of X obligating Y to 
act according to X’s wishes on the grounds that X told (be it asked, 
commanded etc.) him to do so.  In such cases, although no physical force or 
pressure is brought to bear, X imposes his will on Y through the giving of 
reasons.      
 Why does such a scenario give rise to a license to exclude and not to 
conform to those obligating interventions?  First, consider the person who is 
the target of the intervention.  Under these conditions, to wrongfully direct 
others limits their liberty and imposes one’s will on them via wronging them.  
To direct without standing is, if you will, a form of ‘normative coercion’.  To 
then hold one bound to those interventions – valid and obligating as they 
may be – is repugnant.  Releasing one from such wrongful intervention seems 
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the best available way of avoiding adding insult to injury.  Accordingly, 
complying with the balance of reasons under such conditions ought to be a 
matter of choice, not of normative coercion.  
 Second, to wrongfully impose one’s will on others runs afoul of the 
somewhat nebulous yet (presumably) practically universally accepted 
principle that ‘no one may profit from his own wrongdoing’.  A principle felt, 
for example, in its widespread influence in law.44  Plainly put, at least 
sometimes we balk at the prospect of people wronging others and then 
continuing to enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing.  Accordingly, profiting or 
benefiting from one’s wrongdoing often appears an additional disvalue to the 
wrong itself.  As already explained, directing without standing wrongs the 
directive’s target.  To allow the wrongful intervener to enjoy the fruit of her 
wrongdoing – that is, allowing her to get her way by letting her wrongful 
imposition on another’s liberty continue unchecked – is repugnant.  Given 
that we are dealing with a scenario in which the directive-reason has already 
been given, providing for an option to disregard such a valid yet ongoing 
wrongful directive seems the most reasonable avenue for foiling wrongdoers 
benefiting from their wrongs at the expense of their victims. 
 Third, a permission to exclude even obligating directives is in line with 
at least many of the values, discussed above, underlying practices of TMK.  As 
                                                             
44 The legal principle of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, that is, “no cause of 
action can arise out of an immoral (or illegal) inducement (or consideration)”, 
found in tort and contract law is one such example.  Another example is the 
various ‘slayer rules’ which disqualify murderers from inheriting from their 
victims, that is, denying an otherwise lawful heir her claim against the 
victim’s estate (where the estate stands for the deceased) due to her 
wrongdoing.  See e.g., Code Napoleon, paragraph 727 (a murderer or one 
who attempted murder shall not inherit from his victim); Riggs v. Palmer, 22 
N.E. 188 (1889); Marcianus D.34.9.3. (In Roman law, the slayer rule was one 
instance of the more general idea of indignus succedendi, that is, being 
unworthy of succeeding); Forfeiture Act, 1982, c. 34 (Eng.).  Another example 
is the reduced duty of care that occupiers owe trespassers in tort law.  See 
e.g. the English Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984.  
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we already saw, liberty, autonomy, privacy, intimacy etc. are the sort of 
values that warrant protected spheres of choice, counting in favor of 
permissions to exclude certain interventions.  When such liberal values are at 
stake, often what matters is less what we do and more that it is we who 
decide what to do, even at the price of certain normative errors and 
unreasonable conduct.   
 Finally, the plausibility of permissions to exclude even obligating 
reasons is enhanced when noticing other normative categories (more widely 
recognized than “standing”) that also provide for protection or a license to 
act against the balance of reasons.  Standing does not, if you will, stand 
alone.  One such category is ‘right to do wrong’, under which one enjoys 
protection from certain interventions with one’s choice to breach one’s 
duties.45   
 A second category is supererogation.  Supererogation also permits not 
acting on the balance of reasons.  Supererogatory actions are praiseworthy 
even though failing to perform them is not blameworthy.  The 
praiseworthiness of supererogatory actions suggests there must be 
conclusive reasons in their favor.  But how then is one not blameworthy for 
not acting on the balance of reasons?  Thus, although many accept the 
existence of supererogatory actions, the category seems incoherent.  Raz’s 
way of explaining the coherence of supererogation is to invoke the idea of 
the exclusionary permission.46  Although norms of supererogation allow 
acting against the balance of reasons, they do so as second-order reasons of 
exclusion, and therefore do not clash with the balance of first-order reasons, 
avoiding incoherence.47      
 Also involving exclusionary permissions, norms of standing are arguably 
                                                             
45 Waldron, ‘A right to Do Wrong’; Herstein, ‘Defending the right To Do 
Wrong.’   
46 Raz, ‘Practical Reasons and Norms’, pp. 91-97. 
47 As for the grounds of such permissions, I will here just assume that 
supererogation is a genuine moral category. 
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at least partially akin to norms of supererogation.  The repugnancy of what I 
called ‘normative coercion’ and of one benefiting from one’s victim by 
victimizing him, as well as the values at stake in cases of TMK, such as 
autonomy, respect, and privacy, push matters of TMK into a neighborhood 
nearing that of supererogation.  In fact, it is not implausible to describe some 
of the examples given throughout the paper in terms of supererogation.  For 
instance, it would be good to grant the request of one’s hypocritical friend or 
to adhere to a stranger’s meddlesome yet sensible intervention in one’s spat 
with one’s spouse; still, if one decides not to do so, one would not be to 
blame; it is, in a sense, a permissible choice not to act on the balance of 
reasons.  Thus, although perhaps not identical, some of the more puzzling 
features of norms of standing are arguably also found in the far more familiar 
norms of supererogation.   
 Thinking of standing as akin to supererogation also fits the fact, 
explored above, that when we enjoy the permission to disregard directives 
we, nevertheless, often choose to take those directives into account and 
even act on those directives, thereby choosing not to exercise our permission 
to exclude them.  And doing so tends to come with a sense that one has 
‘gone beyond the call of duty’.  For instance, I can imagine talking with my 
hypocritical friend while driving her to the airport saying, “You know, I don’t 
have to do this.”  The supererogatory flavor of standing norms is also 
apparent in the resentment we sometimes feel at being put in the position of 
having to choose whether or not to disregard an intervention issued without 
standing – sensing the obligating force of such interventions, we can feel 
conflicted as we appreciate the normative price that comes with disregarding 
them.      
5  THE LIMITS OF STANDING  
Even if I am right about the form of the justification of the normativity of 
standing as reflected in practices such as TMK, it is important to note that not 
all interventions into the affairs of others involve a breach of a duty of 
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nonintervention and a permission to disregard.  First, our practices 
themselves are measured – not all interests of privacy, autonomy, or equal 
respect are considered protected from interventions.  Second, our practices 
can, at least in principle, overreach – not all interventions setting back the 
various interests involved in TMK practices violate moral standing, even if 
that were the social norm or legal practice.  After all, there are at times 
reasons in favor of intervening and against resisting interventions, reasons 
which may defeat the reasons in favor of a duty to the contrary or of a 
permission to resist an intervention.  The fact is that even hypocritical or 
meddling interventions into the affairs of others may nevertheless serve a 
slew of valuable functions.  Discussing standing to blame, Macalester Bell 
rightly points out that: 
“[W]hile people may manifest hypocrisy and other faults in their 
critical interventions, there is no reason to conclude that these faults 
always undermine a person’s standing to blame.  As we have seen, 
blame has multiple aims and modes of value.”48  
 All I claim here is that along with other considerations mentioned 
above, the values that practices such as TMK typically serve to protect are of 
the type that is typically weighty enough to ground at least pro tanto duties 
of nonintervention and to similarly license disregarding such interventions.  
Yet, even if they do so typically, the reasons underlying the normativity of 
standing do not necessarily defeat conflicting reasons in favor of permitting 
interventions or against discounting or excluding them.  Whether such 
conflicting reasons prevail of course will depend on the specific 
circumstances.  For example, the values of marital privacy and intimacy 
certainly do not amount to excluding third parties from intervening in 
domestic abuse and do not license abusive husbands to resist others’ 
attempts at intervening.   
6  CONCLUSION 
                                                             
48 Bell, ‘The Standing to Blame: A Critique’, p. 275.   
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We began with a description of a normative structure that I labeled 
“standing.”  Norms of standing involve conditions under which one is 
forbidden from intervening in the affairs of others as well as determine how 
one may react when intervened with by those who lack the standing to do so.  
This normative structure or form of standing appears in various familiar 
practices, which I grouped into three general (non-exhaustive) categories: ‘tu 
quoque’, ‘mind your own business’, and ‘know thy place’ (or ‘TMK’ for short).  
Each category turns on a different type of ad hominem facts upon which 
social norms of standing supervene, denying standing in cases of intervening 
hypocritically, out of meddling, or without the requisite status. 
 The normativity of standing turns on facts about the intervening party 
and not on the validity of their intervention.  Accordingly, standing does not 
exhibit the logic of invalidation and, therefore, is not a norm of power and 
authority.  Rather, norms of standing are norms that license resisting even 
valid interventions.  And, as explained, when such interventions take the 
form of directives, norms of standing provide a license to resist in the form of 
a permission to exclude those directives.   
 Of the normative structure of standing, the feature that most calls for 
clarification is how intervening under the conditions of TMK licenses 
discounting, disregarding as well as frustrating the issuing or performance of 
what appear valid and even obligating interventions.  For example, why is it 
permissible to disregard a valid condemnation simply because its issuer is an 
outsider or a stranger to the proceedings, or lacks status, or is hypocritical?49   
 The justifications I offered for these atypical norms are predicated on 
the values that these standing practices reflect and protect, such as moral 
equality, privacy, autonomy, and valuable relationship.  Values that typically 
justify standing’s pro tanto duties of nonintervention and license disregarding 
                                                             
49 Notice that condemnation gives reasons for both belief and action. See 
Herstein, ‘Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect reasons, pp. 3116-
3118.   
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(even conclusive) interventions performed in breach of those duties.  
Moreover, these values, along with further considerations mentioned above, 
can justify excluding even obligating directives.  Yet, as explained, these 
arguments in favor of standing practices are not meant as all-things-
considered justifications.  Competing reasons can, on occasion, defeat them.  
 Finally, I have said little about the standing of political authorities and 
law.  The focus here was mainly on the interpersonal context.  Moreover, 
little attention has been given to the specifics of authoritative directives as 
opposed to other directives.  Yet, a few words are, I think, in order.  When an 
authority is legitimate, we normally ought to do what the authority directs us 
to do, on the grounds that the authority directed us to do so.  Authoritative 
reasons are, therefore, a type of directive-reason.  Yet, can legitimate 
authority lack standing?  Is there a distinction between the ‘right to rule’ (in 
the sense of having standing to rule through law) and the legitimacy of one’s 
rule (in the sense of moral power to issue laws)?  Extrapolating from the 
interpersonal context, I believe the answer is ‘yes’.  The right to exercise 
authority does not necessarily always accompany holding (legitimate) 
authority.  One type of example is cases of reformed and now legitimate 
regimes guilty of past injustices.  The gap between the genuine moral validity 
of the laws of such authorities and the occasionally questionable standing of 
those authorities to exercise those laws is apparent in the occasional 
understandably indignant and resentful attitudes that victims of those past 
injustices and their descendants hold towards the regime and its laws.50  
7  EPILOGUE: WHY EXPLAIN AND JUSTIFY STANDING?  
The normative structure of standing appears in numerous facets of human 
interaction.  Arguments from standing are regularly deployed to block and 
disregard both actions and speech of various types.  In addition, practices of 
                                                             
50 For thoughts along these lines in the context of the criminal law see Antony 
Duff, ‘Blame, Moral Standing and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Trial’, Ratio 
23 (2010), pp. 123-40.   
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standing are prominent, albeit more clandestinely, in deterring those without 
standing from even attempting to intervene for worry of condemnation and 
rejection.  Also important is how the normativity of standing is animated in 
various doctrines of legal standing.  Appreciating the logic of the normative 
structure of standing and its justifications is, therefore, important for 
assessing standing’s many and various practical manifestations.   
 Moreover, standing is a precarious practice.  Practices of standing are 
easily distorted.  It is not always obvious whether the conditions 
determinative of standing obtain (e.g., is it or isn’t it ‘your business’?).  Thus, 
while there is a truth-value to propositions about who does or does not have 
standing, there is often no agreement or obvious way for determining the 
matter.  This is precarious, because standing is a very efficient tool for 
defeating opponents in that it permits silencing and disregarding others 
because of who they are without having to engage them substantively.  
Considering that at times it is not clear to people who in fact has and who 
does not have standing, the social availability of standing-claims opens the 
door to error, self-deception, and manipulation in how social standing norms 
are in practice deployed, which often results in excluding, discriminating, and 
silencing others who may actually have the requisite standing to intervene 
and participate.  Nowhere is this truer and more destructive than in politics 
and international affairs.          
 Standing is a precarious practice also because practices of standing are 
regrettably often deployed with the purpose of challenging the truth-value of 
both factual and normative propositions, as if the identity of the speaker is 
determinative not only of her standing to interject but also of whether or not 
what she says is true or whether her prescriptions are for doing the right 
thing.  Although common, such practices are patently irrational, suffering 
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from an obvious ad hominem fallacy.51  
 Accordingly, the norm of standing is often misused and misunderstood, 
leading to silencing legitimate criticism, negating true propositions, unjustly 
undermining credibility, spreading mistrust, debasing nuance, derailing self-
reflection and corrupting both private and public discourse.  Which is why 
clarifying both the logic of standing and when and why standing norms are 
justified is an important and worthwhile endeavor.52   
                                                             
51 For a recent discussion of the fallacy see Uri D. Leibowitz, ‘Moral 
Deliberation and Ad Hominem Fallacies’, Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 
(2016), pp. 507-29. 
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